The Torch Magazine

The Pygmalion Effect and Public Administration

by William Shendow

"Treat a man as he is, he will remain so. Treat a man the way he can be and ought to be, and he will become as he can and should be." -- Goethe

    A number of studies have examined self-fulfilling prophecies—the "Pygmalion effect." External expectations, many studies have found, can have a positive, subconscious effect upon the performance of workers individually and collectively. The Pygmalion effect has been observed in a number of fields, initially and most notably in the field of education through the studies of Robert Rosenthal and Lenore Jacobson. A student's performance, their studies indicated, is frequently improved by the expectations of others: those students who were expected to perform well usually did so, while those students who sensed low expectations of their performance generally lived up—or down—to the perceived expectations of others and performed poorly (Kelman 121).

     In 2004, World Bank economists Karla Hoff and Priyanka Pandey conducted an experiment among 11- and 12-year-old students representing various castes in rural India. First, the students were told that their teachers predicted they would do well in solving the puzzles on which the experiment was based. The puzzles were then distributed without any reference to the castes the students represented. Under these conditions, the lower caste students did just as well or even better than the upper class students in solving the puzzles. Next, another set of puzzles were distributed to the students. This time, the castes of the student participants were identified. The results showed a significant difference between the scores of the boys in the two castes, the lower caste boys scoring much lower than their upper caste counterparts. When the students were identified as inferior, members of a lower caste, they performed poorly in keeping with the lower expectations of themselves and others (Wilkinson and Pickett 113).

The Pygmalion effect has since been examined with respect to therapists and clients, nurses and patients, and managers and employees. Building on J. Livingston's study Pygmalion in Management, Dov Eden of the Tel Aviv University's Faculty of Management and his colleague A. B. Shani designed research to show the relevance of the Pygmalion effect on the training of the Israeli Defense Force. Military leaders, their 1982 study found, could improve performance of soldiers in training through the heightened expectations of military leaders outside of military units, showing that the Pygmalion effect had relevance beyond the original educational setting where it was first discovered and replicated (Eden 394-398 ).

    Despite a growing body of research on this phenomenon, to date there are relatively few studies of the Pygmalion effect in public administration or government. Most of the studies of the Pygmalion effect as it relates to government have focused on how the public's negative expectations of government and those who serve in government have led to less than the best administrative performance. Widespread cynicism and low expectations of government pervade most societies, including ours. Is the mediocre public administration we too often see the result is a self-fulfilling prophecy?

    Many public administration scholars think so, concluding that low societal expectations of government have made it all the harder to improve public administration. Blinton Milward and Hal Rainey, in an article titled "Don't Blame the Bureaucracy" (1983), wrote that "the bludgeoning of bureaucrats can create a vicious cycle in which improved administration is most difficult" (393-495). Frederick Mosher echoed them in his book Democracy and the Public Service (1982): "anti-government attacks have a tendency to become a self-fulfilling prophecy, for few of the best people in government will want to give their best or stay in government when they are the butt of repeated charges of incompetency, dishonesty and laziness by their neighbors, the media and even their boss" (Mosher xii). Dr. Charles Goodsell, in The Case for Bureaucracy (1994), noted that politicians of both political parties were guilty of "bureaucrat bashing"; Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan and Newt Gingrich all expressed anti-government sentiment for political advantage (King and Stivers 6-7).

Changing the Cycle of Low Societal Expectations

   Changing the cycle of a society's low expectations requires leaders who are both optimistic and trustworthy. Optimism begets optimism, resulting in a self-fulfilling prophecy of improved performance, and leaders who inspire public trust can lift expectations. Can we create the climate in which such leaders can emerge?

    Since government leaders share many of the same objectives as those who are served by government, John Paterson argues in "Bureaucratic Reform by Cultural Revolution," the two should unite as allies, not to attack the bureaucracy, but rather in support of constructive ways to build expectations and improve the administration of government. He says further that "properly mobilized, the leader can use external pressures commonly seen as hostile as a positive force for change" (Ott and Russell 261-262).

    Many would see such a hope as politically naïve, based on a romanticized conception of leadership (Meindl et al. 78-102). Yet the type of unity Patterson proposes has deep historical roots, according to Camilla Stivers and Cheryl King in Government Is Us (1998). In many periods, Americans have exhibited positive attitudes towards government and viewed the bureaucracy as agents of the people (King and Stivers 12-14). William D. Ruckelshaus' directorship of the Environmental Protection Agency and President John F. Kennedy's championing of the Apollo project are illustrative examples of how a leader can, by building external expectations, forge the type of support and unity necessary for success.

William R. Ruckelshaus and The Environmental Protection Agency

    Established in 1970, the Environmental Protection Agency initially enjoyed a high level of trust as an advocate of the public interest, thanks largely to its first director, William R. Ruckelshaus. High expectations within and outside of the agency allowed Ruckelshaus to recruit a competent and dedicated staff, establish a mission, set clear goals, and begin the work of implementing environmental policy. The agency quickly gained credibility among a core external constituency that included the executive branch, the legislative branch, business, public interest lobby organizations, and the general public. (The public interest lobby organizations in particular were key to the agency's success, the interests of these groups often coinciding with those of the agency and providing a countervailing influence to those special interests that would seek to co-opt the EPA [Harris and Milkus 4-10]).

    In two and a half years, Ruckelshaus laid a solid foundation of support among the agency's core external constituencies. His integrity led in 1973 to his selection and confirmation as Acting FBI Director and later appointment as Deputy Attorney General—an appointment that did not last long, as both he and his former boss Elliott Richardson chose to resign rather than carry out the order of President Nixon to fire Watergate prosecutor Archibald Cox.
In 1983 Ruckelshaus returned to serve a second term as Director of the Environmental Protection Agency. During the intervening years between Ruckelshaus' first and second term as director, the agency's credibility had reached an all-time low under Ann Gorsuch Burford. By Ruckelshaus's own account, the EPA's administration under Burford and her political appointees was a disaster, resulting in a thoroughly demoralized staff, a directionless organization and an at times openly hostile core constituency (Gorn, EPA Oral History Interview, January 1993). The situation called for a leader capable of turning around the organization. In Ruckelshaus the EPA was fortunate to have such a leader.

    By analyzing what Ruckelshaus did and did not do during his second term (1983-1985) to resurrect the credibility of the Environmental Protection Agency, we can see the role of external expectations in evoking improved public administration. According to Raanan Lipshitz and Leon Mann in their article for the Journal of Leadership and Organization (2005), Ruckelshaus consciously chose not to attempt to directly motivate his subordinates. Why? Lipshitz and Mann suggest that Ruckelhaus' broader conceptualization of leadership, which expanded beyond the internal organization to the organization's external shareholders, led him to concentrate his efforts on building positive expectations of the agency in the external community. Restoring the EPA's credibility, Ruckelshaus believed, depended on raising the expectations of the agency's various external shareholders rather than on his ability to motivate subordinates (Lipshitz and Mann 44; Gorn, EPA Oral History Interview, 1993).

    The growing positive external expectations that Ruckelhaus cultivated as part of a broader conceptualization of leadership indirectly motivated his staff by marshaling the forces of external expectations to evoke improved administrative performance. The re-energized EPA thus reached new levels of administrative performance during his second term (Harris and Milkus 265).

John F. Kennedy and NASA's Man on the Moon Project

    In the 20th century, there are at least three examples of our nation's president's evoking the best from the bureaucracy by raising societal expectations. At the turn of the century, Teddy Roosevelt built expectations of constructing a canal in Central America linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. FDR did it with his fireside chats about combating the Great Depression and overcoming the Fascist threat to democracy. Finally there is President Kennedy's historical commitment in 1961 to put a man on the moon and return him safely home before the end of the decade.

    The man on the moon or Apollo project exemplifies a number of key leadership elements important to using societal expectations to evoke improved administrative performance. First and probably foremost, the introduction of the Apollo project is a clear example of visionary leadership and the use of communication skills to develop support for one's vision.

    In Kennedy's speech introducing the project before a joint session of Congress on May 25, 1961, he said, "it is time for a great American enterprise…a time for the nation to take the clearly leading role in space achievement which in many ways may hold the key to our future on earth." Feeling the expectations of the crowd, Kennedy seized the moment and concluded his remarks by saying, "I believe this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing man on the Moon and returning him safely the earth" (Shepard and Slayton 133).
Besides showing visionary leadership, Kennedy's speech shows the power of creating expectancy. In 1961, many feared that the U.S was falling behind the U.S.S.R. in space technology and international prestige; Americans both inside and outside of government felt frustrated because no real action was being taken to secure America's superiority. Expectations were not high, but both the government organizations (who would be empowered administratively to fulfill his expectations) and the external, societal community (who would be the main beneficiaries of such an accomplishment) wanted to believe. So, when Kennedy asked for the moon, he encountered a supportive audience.

Kennedy's challenge illustrates another component of leadership important to the success of raising expectations in that the project was not only plausible, but also possible. Seemingly spontaneous, the decision to go to the moon was actually well thought-out and based on evidence that fulfilling the pledge was achievable. Kennedy knew that the U. S. had the technology and the people necessary to accomplish a moon landing. The only thing missing was to marshal the resources for such a challenge and to raise the efficacy expectations of the organization, NASA, which would be responsible for the project's success (Reynolds 42).

    Many attribute the lifting of the morale of the National Aeronautical and Space Administration organization and the efficiency of the NASA staff in meeting raised expectations to Kennedy's visionary leadership. Those associated with the project developed a growing sense that the external expectations and support for the project would be rewarded with success. Project space scientist or engineers working for NASA during the initial years of the project were perceived as part of the government elite. Astronauts were heroes and space projects were a national pastime. Hundreds of thousands of demanding, high paying jobs were created in the space program and in education to support the Apollo project. The program was driven by the spirit of exploration and a dedication to fulfilling their President's high expectations (Shepler 2-3).

    On July 20, 1969, President Kennedy's expectation was fulfilled when astronaut Neil Armstrong set foot on the moon. In the course of eight short years, the administration of the nation's space program had been transformed. The expectations of a moon landing by the end of a decade had elevated administrative efforts to new heights. David West writes in his book Apollo: The Epic Journey to the Moon, "thousands upon thousands of government workers and managers stretched themselves to their mental and physical limits for years to accomplish what many believed was an impossible goal." This supreme effort across such a broad group of people, West maintains, could have only come from a genuine shared belief in the magnitude of such a great undertaking. Kennedy's raising of societal expectations had stirred the emotional administrative commitment necessary to make the lunar landing possible (Reynolds 45).

Conclusions

    When a society is receptive to change and a leader who commands trust is in a position of authority, there is an opportunity for the use of heightened external expectations to invoke improved administrative performance within the bureaucracy. Granted, there is no single path to improved public administration, no formula that guarantees success, because historical experience, values, traditions, leadership and levels of public trust vary so greatly from one society and organization to another. The author never intended to represent this inquiry as offering the one infallible solution to this ancient problem. The writer did intend, however, to prompt consideration of a somewhat novel approach to improving public administration in hope it might stimulate a dialogue not only on the merits of the proposition put forth in this paper, but on other approaches deserving of consideration.

    While this paper focuses on the application of this approach at national level, improving administrative performance through heightened expectations is applicable for all levels of government. Indeed, this approach may well have greater chance for success at state and local levels, where there exists greater trust of government and government leaders. The concept also has implications for the private sector. For that matter, the proposition has relevance for all organizations seeking to improve administrative performance.

    To the naysayer who will fail to see the general citizenry and elected officials ever uniting with the bureaucracy for improved administrative performance, I extend the challenge to join the discussion. All who value good government have a stake in improving public administration. It is a goal deserving of our consideration. If this paper has furthered consideration of a dialogue aimed at improving public administration, it has achieved its purpose.

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William Shendow Biography

    Dr. William Shendow, chairman of Political Science Department and Coordinator of the Graduate Public Management Certificate Program at Shenandoah University, holds a Ph.D. in Public Administration from Virginia Polytechnic and State University, as well as degrees from Georgetown and Wake Forest University.

    Beyond the bounds of academia, he has served as President of the Winchester-Frederick County Chamber of Commerce, Executive Director of the Industrial Development Corporation, councilman for the City of Winchester, Vice President of Bells, Inc., and as Intelligence Officer in the United States Army. He earned a Bronze Star in Viet Nam.

     His paper was originally delivered to the Winchester Torch Club in January, 2012.