Offender
Perceptions of Focused Deterrence:
The High Point Model
by
Terrell A.
Hayes
High Point
University
Introduction
Beginning in 1997
the High Point Police Department (HPPD)
implemented the first in a series of crime
initiatives in an effort to deter violence
and drug-related crimes in the city of
High Point, NC. The first of these
initiatives, the Violent Crimes Task Force
(VCTF), relied on a comprehensive,
collaborative data-driven strategic
approach to identify violent and repeat
offenders in an effort to reduce violent
crime throughout the city. In partnership
with David Kennedy of the John Jay College
of Criminal Justice and the architect
behind Boston's Operation Ceasefire
program to halt gang violence in the
1990's, the HPPD launched the second of
these initiatives in High Point's West End
neighborhood in November 2003.
Kennedy's focused deterrence strategy
emphasizes increased risk to offenders,
finding new and creative ways to use law
enforcement resources, and offering a
second chance for all but the most
hardened criminals.
The plan as
represented in figure 1 below consists of
three phases: identification,
notification, and resource delivery.
Ongoing two-way dialog between law
enforcement and community members' is
considered critical for success throughout
all three phases. During the
identification phase, law enforcement
identifies "hot spots" of crime to
determine where violent and drug related
crimes are highest (Hunt, Sumner, Frabutt,
and Scholten 2008). Once a neighborhood is
identified, police next speak with local
residents in an effort to identify the
most serious offenders. Those deemed to be
too dangerous are immediately prosecuted.
At the call-in, which takes place during
the notification phase, offenders meet
first with community groups who express
their willingness to assist offenders if
they choose to turn away from a life of
crime but also indicate their
unwillingness to tolerate ongoing criminal
activity in their neighborhoods. During
the second phase of the call-in, law
enforcement delivers in dramatic fashion a
message that offender crimes will no
longer be tolerated and that long-term
incarceration is inevitable. In the
resource delivery phase, community members
are encouraged to keep in touch with
offenders and help those who are seeking
assistance with the acquisition of needed
resources and services.
Figure 1
Phases of the High Point
Model of Focused Deterrence
Identification →
*Map "hot spots"
*Mobilize community
*Identify offenders
*Undercover investigation
*Prosecute dangerous
offenders
|
Notification →
*Compile notification list
*Community/Police Home
Visit
*Call-In
-Offenders meet with
Community
-Offenders meet
with Law Enforcement
|
Resource Delivery
*Community
follow-up with offenders
|
Review of
Literature
The
Effectiveness of Focused Deterrence
Paternoster's (2010) extensive review of
the literature on criminal deterrence led
him to conclude that there is a "marginal
deterrent effect to some changes in
criminal justice policy…[and ] seem[s] to
be a modest inverse relationship between
the perceived certainty of punishment and
crime, but no real evidence of a deterrent
effect for severity, and no real knowledge
base about the celerity of punishment (p.
818)." Looking at crime trends in those
High Point neighborhoods in which the Drug
Market Initiative was implemented 37
months prior to and 37 months following
the intervention, Hipple, Corsaro and
McGarrell (2010) found statistically
significant (p < .10) decreases in
crime. Specifically, they noted that
violent crimes declined an average of 7.3
percent while drug and nuisance offenses
declined roughly 5.5 percent following the
intervention. Although not statistically
significant, they also found that property
offenses had declined 9.1 percent during
that same time. A meta-analysis
(Braga and Weisburd 2012) of ten cities
employing focused deterrence strategies in
an effort to reduce crime found an overall
statistically significant, medium-sized
crime reduction effect. Braga (2012)
notes that while there is good empirical
evidence which indicates that focused
deterrence strategies as currently being
used in many cities in the U.S. to reduce
crime works, he adds that "the available
evaluation literature does not provide
insight on why these programs seem to work
in practice (p. 202)."
Complementary
Crime Control Mechanisms
Several "complementary crime control
mechanisms" (Braga 2012) have been
identified which may have a positive
impact on focused deterrence strategies
ability to reduce crime. These include:
direct, face-to-face communication with
offenders; discouragement and redirection;
and procedural justice and legitimacy.
First, simply communicating directly with
criminal offenders who are frequently
excluded from having any input in crime
control strategies, and who themselves
must ultimately calculate the benefits
versus the risks associated with continued
criminal behavior, may be a key factor in
the success of focused deterrence (Horney
and Marshall, 1992; Kennedy, 1998;
McGarrell, et al. 2006; Nagin, 1998).
Second, discouragement and redirection
which focuses on decreasing opportunities
for crime while simultaneously increasing
alternative opportunity structures by
offering needed social services (e.g., job
and educational assistance) as incentives
for offenders to turn their lives around,
may be beneficial for further reducing
crime. (Braga and Weisburd 2012; Clarke
and Weisburd 1994; Engel, Corsaro, and
Skubak Tillyer 2010; Hayes, DiLuca,
Frabutt, Hefner, and Shelton 2009).
Finally, Kennedy (2008) has called for
offenders to be treated with respect and
dignity. Others (Papachristos, et al.
2007; Paternoster, et al. 1997) also
suggest that the more law enforcement
actions and deterrence strategies are
perceived by offenders to be legitimate,
fair and just, the more likely they will
"buy in" to the program.
There are few available accounts of how
offenders perceive, experience, and react
to the High Point model of focused
deterrence. Here, I report
preliminary findings from a study that
begins to do that while also examining the
extent to which the complementary crime
control mechanisms noted above might help
to account for the overall effectiveness
of the High Point model.
Methods
Individual, semi-structured, qualitative
interviews were conducted with six
notified male offenders that had attended
a call-in as part of the High Point Police
Department's Crime Initiative. One
of the greatest advantages to interviewing
criminal offenders is the unique
perspective they offer regarding "the
perceived effectiveness of crime control
activities in deterring crime (Miethe and
McCorkle 2001: 17)." After being informed
by their respective probation officer or
by the community resource specialist about
the study, offenders self-selected
themselves for participation. Three
of the offenders were interviewed at a
community probation and parole office in
High Point while the remaining three
offenders were interviewed at a community
Weed and Seed Center. Four of the six
offenders were part of the Drug Market
Initiative while the other two offenders
were participants in the earlier Violent
Crime Task Force (VCTF) Initiative. After
obtaining written consent, interviews were
audio-taped and typically lasted 30 to 40
minutes with the longest one lasting 1.5
hours. During the interviews participants
were asked about their overall impressions
of the program, particularly the call-in;
why they chose to participate; the impact
their participation had on them
personally; the benefits and costs they
associated with participation; the
services and resources of which they took
advantage; how they would rate the program
on a scale of 1 to 10 and why; and how
they saw their future. Data from the
interviews were supplemented with
qualitative data obtained from my
attendance at two call-ins as a
non-participant observer and my attendance
at several High Point Community Against
Violence (HPCAV) meetings as a participant
observer, and from insights offered by two
High Point University students working as
interns for the Community Resource Manager
responsible for securing needed resources
for offenders.
Findings
Communications.
The following account demonstrates how
face-to-face communications with members
of the community during the "call-in"
phase of the process can have a positive
impact.
It kinda hurt me to see
what I was doing, hurting them and
hurting their families…that's what
really got to me. One lady [whose house
had gotten broken into 2 or 3 times]
asked me [why I did it]? She was like
it's not right that she should have to
go out there and work for everything she
wants and then somebody just come in her
house and take what she had…On the
outside it was like nothing they said
could affect me but on the inside I was
ashamed. I felt shamed about
myself cause I felt like I was better
than that…It was a bunch of emotions,
really. – Offender #04
This case demonstrates how
one community members' ability to directly
communicate the pain and hurt associated
with her victimization can have a powerful
effect on the offender despite the public
impression he is trying to manage. Here
the offender recalls how the question
posed directly to him by one community
member resonated with him in a way that
indirect communication may not have. In
contrast, the next account reveals the
negative effect one-way communications
during the call-in can have on offenders'
perceptions that they are merely passive
rather than active participants in the
process.
[At the call in] they
don't really give you a chance to say
[anything]…The whole time, nobody
letting us speak. I feel like if you
speaking on me being put behind bars
on downing me as a person I should
have the right to speak. Every time we
[tried] to put in our two cents or
make a comment, they like, "You will
not speak. Be quiet." I might as well
not even be there if I can't state my
opinion…When the community members
talk and the police and the DEA and
all them talk…shouldn't it be a time
when we should be able to [talk]? –
Offender #05
Offenders' inability to
speak can promote feelings of resentment
at the prospect of being disrespected.
This account indicates that for some
offenders at least the inability to have
their voices heard during the
"call-in" has the potential to drive some
away from the program thereby threatening
its success.
Discouragement. In
its ability to discourage continued
criminal activity and keep offenders in
the program, High Point's focused
deterrence strategy appears to have both a
positive and a negative impact.
You had these people
like drill sergeants [at the
call-in]…trying to scare me that's
pretty much what it felt like…do this
and do that or you know what's going to
happen. They were talking about other
people [that] had messed up and got
large amounts of time…one person ended
up getting 75 years…I didn't want to see
my life as ending up being incarcerated
all my life. – Offender #01
It [the call-in] really
spooked me…I had me a daughter on the
way so it really made me think. If I
keep doing all this stuff, selling drugs
I am going to end up being locked up
like my sister's boyfriend...It ain't
worth it. If I end up doing twenty years
I won't be able to see my daughter,
she'll grow up with no father. –
Offender #06
They tell you [at the
call-in] that you got a star by your
name…that's not helping. If you have to
put a star beside my name that's not
benefiting me it's just putting me right
back in the same category I was in…In
other words, your saying, he won't
change. He's not ever going to do right.
…They've done sent about 5 or 6
undercover officers to buy dope from
me…For me, the meeting, what I got out
of it was a bunch of BS. – Offender
#02
As indicated in the
first two accounts, law enforcement's
threat of incarceration had a positive
impact in discouraging them from
continuing to engage in criminal
activity by making them reflect on their
respective futures and the impact their
choices would have on others (e.g., a
daughter). In contrast, law
enforcement's acknowledgement that
offenders having been identified were
now subject to having their every move
under constant surveillance – "you got a
star by your name" - had a negative
impact on offender #02 who believed he
really was not being given a second
chance but instead was simply being
watched until he committed another
crime. Similarly, offender #05 expressed
disdain for the overall way law
enforcement officials conducted the
call-in. He was unimpressed with the
grandstanding and scare tactics used by
law enforcement officials believing that
much of it was simply for show.
They [law enforcement]
sounded stupid…They was telling us stuff
about the community and how they got
people watching us…but we don't know who
they is or they got cameras but we don't
know where the camera's at…Just all a
bunch of stuff they were saying like to
scare us…They had pictures on the wall
of our apartments or people's houses
stuff like that to make [it] seem like
they been watching them or
whatever. It was crazy. It was
fake, the whole situation was fake. –
Offender #05
Additional statements
made by offender #05 imply that the
negative tone taken by law enforcement
may have unintended consequences like
making offenders less willing to seek
out services offered or to stay in the
program for the long haul.
I mean you try to help
somebody change, why bother or threaten
them with jail, you know what I'm
saying? That's crazy. If you wanna help
somebody you pull them to the side, let
them know the situation…If they come at
people positively instead of
[community members] downing us and then
the police coming up after them and
threaten us that's not going to make us
leave that meeting and call [anybody for
help]…Then I go home and get to thinking
about everything that was said in the
meeting and the way you all came at us
that's not going to make me want to pick
up the phone…I know one other person
because it's my home boy that really
turned around after the [call in] but he
didn't even ask for their help. He did
it on his own. Right now he's struggling
hard…He got a police record just like me
so it's hard to just go out there and
get a job without certain people behind
you. – Offender #05
Redirection.
As with discouragement, efforts by the
program to offer alternative opportunity
structures (e.g., job, housing, and
educational assistance) as incentives for
offenders willing to work with the program
also produced mixed results. The following
narratives from offenders #04 and #05 show
that while efforts to discourage offenders
from re-offending can have a negative
impact due to the approach taken by law
enforcement (e.g., "scare tactics"), those
negatives are somewhat offset by positive
redirection through the different types of
services and assistance offered.
I've learned being in
the program how to talk to people, how
to give good interviews, how to deal
with my anger more, anything good about
getting a job I've learned. As a matter
of fact, I was just in a job interview
yesterday through the program…At the
call-in they helped me, offered housing,
transportation, and several other, drug
treatment courses, and several other
things…they were really good. I
mean I found myself doing better, being
helped by that. – Offender #04
After we [those who
had been called-in left the meeting
we were telling people] they won't
ever get housing [for us] they won't
ever get jobs. Everybody was down
[on] the program…[A community
member] got on the phone with a lady
from the temp service and he
explained the situation and how he's
behind me 100%. So now even
the city of High Point, they all
behind me…Even the lady up there at
the personnel said that all of her
employees, all of them are gonna put
their effort toward finding me a
full time job. So as far as like
people sticking to their word,
promises they made [they] stuck to
everything that came out of their
mouth. – Offender #05
For others, however, unfulfilled
promises regarding service and resource
delivery made during the call-in left
some offenders with the feeling they had
been duped.
You have all these
community people talking to us like we
will help you which it's all hogwash you
know?…There's hardly no jobs but they
say, "Yeah we will help you get a job."
I took advantage of a work program but
to be truthful that program did not work
at all. The only thing it did was give
me bus tickets to catch the city bus.
That's it. I called every day to see if
there is a job opening. I did that for
like six or seven months. I called other
resources to see if they could help me.
None of the other resources could help
me. As far as the community saying they
are there to help us, they really are
not…it's deceiving. – Offender #01
They said they were
going to do these other things and they
don't. All that big talk they did about
these jobs. They told us in that meeting
that there would be jobs with the city,
in parks and recreation, and all this. I
was thinking I could call these people
and in three days have a job. …My cousin
was also at the call-in he said the same
thing he tried to get a job. The rest of
those guys, I don't think they even
tried to get a job. – Offender #02
There was a guy at the
call-in giving out cards and gave me
five job [leads]. I called him one time
talked to him on the phone...[After
that] I really never heard back from
him. So basically what I did was
try to go out on my own and find
things…I mean there aren't too many
people out there who are willing to
help. They'll say they'll help but
you they're not really willing –
Offender #03
The importance of community follow through
on assistance for making redirection a
reality for criminal offenders, cannot be
overemphasized if High Point's focused
deterrence model is to be successful in
the long run. In exiting a drug dealing
career Adler (1993) observed that the most
frequent pattern that upper level drug
dealers experience in the "phasing out"
process was resolving to quit after
carrying out once last big sell. Others
planned to get out of drug dealing but
never did. Neither of these patterns is
relevant to offenders participating in the
High Point Initiative since law
enforcement already knew of their actions
and their "phase out" was, therefore,
forced and immediate. Two patterns
identified by Adler (1993), however, may
be relevant to crime initiative
participants who were drug offenders and
serve as a cautionary tale for the
program's success. Alder noted that while
some did suspend their dealing activities,
they did not replace them with an
alternative source of income.
Subsequently, once money ran out some felt
forced to go back to dealing. Some
continued to sell a little on the side
while working their way back to legitimate
forms of employment. Offender #05
suggests that those behind the High Point
Crime Initiative should understand that an
individual will do whatever he has to do
when times are tough in order to survive,
even if it might be illegal.
It's fucked up out there
for a lot of people man. Like not just
black people, this ain't a race issue,
it's fucked up out here for a lot of
people period in general like people
can't get jobs, or there's people out
here who have no food to eat, you know
what I'm saying? When their family turn
their back on them, or if their family
don't got much to offer, then a man put
in that situation, where he ain't got
nowhere to go no food to eat, no nothing
you know what I mean? Wrong is
right. – Offender #05
These comments suggest
that loyalty to oneself and to one's
family take priority over obeying the law.
Even though selling drugs is wrong there
are times it may be necessary for survival
in which case "wrong is right."
Observations from individuals working in
an auxiliary role to support the crime
initiative also imply that a lack of jobs
for offenders and promises of assistance
not kept may undermine offenders'
willingness to stick with the program. At
one of the monthly meetings of HPCAV, one
of the probation officers in attendance
complained that resources to help
offenders did not seem to be available,
noting in particular that jobs are few and
far between. The probation officer also
suggested that perhaps "we should tone it
down at the call-ins. Promises are being
made but not delivered." Additionally, two
local university students who spent three
days assisting the Community Resource
Manager found that identifying a list of
employers willing to hire ex-offenders was
nearly impossible.
We spent approximately
1.5 hours the first day calling temp
agencies around the area. We
found that almost every temp agency
accepts ex-offenders but the temp
agencies themselves are looking for
individuals they might be able to place
in a job. The temp agencies have trouble
finding companies or clients who are
willing to take the ex-offenders that
they accept. Some of the agencies
we contacted actually asked us if we
knew of any employers that were hiring
ex-offenders. We found that to be ironic
since that is the question we were
hoping to be able to answer. – HPU
student intern
The students also noted from their efforts
to locate potential employment
opportunities that management was often
unaware of company policy on hiring
persons with a criminal history.
Frequently the person(s)
we needed to speak with were simply not
available. In some instances management
did not even know what company policy
was with regard to hiring ex-offenders.
Fast food restaurants would accept
applications…Even if the offenders are
successful in landing one of these jobs
the wages are minimal and insufficient
to live on. When many of these
offenders were dealing drugs, they were
making more money on their time and were
able to support their families and
lifestyles. Giving up that easy
money and having to work around the
employer's schedule does not appeal to
many offenders. – HPU Student intern
Finding stable employment so that
offenders might make enough money to
offset any temptation they might have to
return to criminal activity is a key
obstacle to an offender's ability to
redirect his behavior.
Procedural
Justice & Legitimacy.
It is important that offenders in the
focused deterrence program be treated with
respect and dignity (Kennedy 2008) and
believe the actions of law enforcement are
fair and just (Papachristos, et. al. 2007;
Paternoster, et. al. 1997). For some,
having been identified by law enforcement
and having attended the call-in and
participating in the program is thought to
be punishment enough. The constant
monitoring and attention paid to them by
law enforcement is viewed as a form of
harassment especially if they commit a
relatively minor offense (e.g., speeding)
after entering the program.
I had both my kids [in
the car] on our way to church and I got
pulled over…He [police] pulls me over
and gives me a ticket for doing 64 mph
in a 55 mph speed zone. When he gives me
the ticket he asks me to get out of the
car so he can explain the ticket to me…I
said look here man, I know what you want
to do, you want to search the car…I just
jumped out of the car and told him to go
ahead and search it. He gets all up in
my face. He gets mad. I mean I think
that is a crock of shit if they just see
me driving down the highway and they
pull me over after reading my tags and
my names pops up, okay he's a violator,
he's on that list…In the past year I've
probably been pulled over five times and
four out of five times I've been
searched. – Offender #02
Further comments by offender #02 indicate
that the legitimacy of the crime
initiative is compromised when offenders
perceive law enforcement as using empty
threats to deter further criminal
activity. Deterrence theory suggests that
when the costs associated with crime are
low and the probability of punishment is
uncertain, criminal offenders are more
likely to engage in criminal activity
(Cornish and Clarke 2014). In this
account, offender #02 perceives "quid pro
quo" at work. Committing additional crimes
following the call-in is no guarantee of
incarceration "if you rat" another
offender out.
The other thing about
that meeting [the call-in], if what they
said is what they're going to do, that's
an advantage. But when they tell you one
thing [then do another], I mean you've
got people in there screaming and
hollering and going crazy, telling
people if they get charges their bond is
going to be so high…Then you get out of
there and two days later you've got a
boy in the neighborhood who was sitting
beside you at the meeting and he has a
drug charge. I'm thinking, okay, we
won't be seeing him for a while. By the
time you crank your car and pull out of
the back yard he is walking down the
street again… I know 4 or 5 people from
my neighborhood that were sitting there
in the meeting beside me got more
charges [after the call-in] and they are
signing themselves out. I believe that
if you are telling on people you can
stay out on the streets longer, that's
all that it is. If you rat you can
stay out here as long as you want to…If
you're not working for them [law
enforcement] they will put you out in
the dry. – Offender #02
Offender #05 was also
angered by the general tone taken by law
enforcement during the call-in, one which
reflected an overall disrespect for him as
a human being.
Talk to me like I'm a
human. Don't down me right here in my
face and expect me to sit here
gratefully and accept you downing me
like I'm inhuman or my actions make me
less than what I really am…I mean you
sitting there telling me that I'm a bad
person or threatening me with locking me
up… The whole situation is crazy…I felt
disrespected. – Offender #05
For young, urban, black males, the issue
of respect lies at the very heart of a
"code of the streets" (Anderson 1994). If
an individual is "dissed" the code
requires some kind of restitution to right
the wrong committed. On the street, one
way to right a wrong is through physical
violence. In this case, one way for the
offender to save face or right the wrong
committed against him would be to no
longer cooperate with law enforcement.
Additional comments by offender #05
further suggest that insult was added to
injury when a local television station ran
a news story on the offenders at the
call-in.
What makes you think
that somebody wants to call [and ask for
assistance] after they hear you downing
them on TV. That right there is just a
main point like they downed us on TV.
For those [of us] who were at the
meeting I can guarantee you that was
probably the turning point that really
made them say I'm not going to deal with
these people… ain't nobody going to pick
up the phone and call…we're not going to
want to reach out grab your hand for
help. – Offender #05
These last three accounts suggest that
when offenders conclude they have reason
to believe there is a lack of procedural
justice, or a reason to question the
legitimacy of actions directed at them by
law enforcement, both during and after the
call-in, the programs efforts to deter
future criminal behavior by offenders may
be undermined.
Discussion
As Copes and Hochstetler (2005) have
noted, "little can be done about
selection biases introduced by
volunteering"... [As researchers we]
"must accept that we generally only know
the stories of those who choose to tell
them as they choose to tell them" (p.
25). Self-selection bias aside,
accounts offered here by six offenders
participating in the High Point Crime
Initiative have shed light on questions
surrounding the effectiveness of High
Point's model of focused deterrence.
Although the High Point model has been
implemented in other cities in North
Carolina as well as across the U.S.,
none to date have arguably been as
successful as in High Point. Although
all six offenders expressed some
gratitude for essentially being given a
second chance, just as many negatives as
positives regarding how the crime
initiative works in reality were
expressed. The overall impression of the
call-in is that there is a lot of
theatrics and grandstanding. Law
enforcement makes a big show to impress
or intimidate but there is the
perception that they do not consistently
back up with actions their rhetoric.
This applies both to helping with needed
resources and also to delivering on
promises as to what will happen if a
participant in the program re-offends.
Offenders implied that if the program
was really meant to help then law
enforcement wouldn't do things which
show disrespect to the offender.
Offenders also suggested that some
actions (e.g., random traffic stops,
allowing television cameras at the
call-in, not allowing offenders to speak
at the call-in) on the part of law
enforcement have unintended consequences
that can serve as an obstacle to the
program's success. Being treated with
respect and fairness seems to be valued
more highly than receiving community
assistance with acquiring needed
resources and services.
At one HPCAV meeting, a probation
officer echoed offenders' sentiments
observing that "the call-ins are very
intimidating." In response, another
community member in attendance pointed
out that the probation officer should
come to the session where community
members are interacting with offenders
to see the "other side of the process."
Indeed, it is the other side of the
process which I believe also helps to
account for the success of High Point's
model of focused deterrence.
Specifically, the willingness of a
community member to step forward as a
"champion" for an offender who might
otherwise have second thoughts about the
program overall, is a key element in
whether that offender will remain in the
program. Of the six interviews conducted
to date, the experience of offender #05
best exemplifies what I call "the
champion effect." A champion is someone
who believes in the offender's ability
to turn his life around, who acts as a
mentor and life coach, is willing to go
to great lengths by giving of his time
and reputation in support of the
offender. The champion draws from his
own store of social, economic and
political capital in support of the
offenders cause. Of the six offenders
interviewed, offender #05 was by far the
most outspoken and critical in his
disdain for how he was treated by law
enforcement in general and how the
notification and call-in were
orchestrated. However, the high praise
he had for two community members more
than offset his negative feelings toward
law enforcement. In particular, the
efforts of Jim Summey, the Executive
Director of High Point Communities
Against Violence (HPCAV) and Yon Weaver,
a community resource specialist with the
City of High Point's Housing and
Community Development Department, were
key to his willingness to stay with the
program.
I pretty much called
everybody that gave us a [phone] number
at the [call in]…[Jim and Yon were] the
only two that responded. I mean they
called, they stayed in contact…Every
time anything has to be done as far as
like with the house or any bills or me
getting a job both of them are right
behind me, 100%.... like I moved into my
house two or three weeks after the
meeting [call-in] thanks to them. They
helped me get my lights turned on, I
mean it's the sign, if you know what I'm
saying…Jim, I don't even look at him as
far as like a government official kinda
like that…He will bring food by or he'll
talk to my landlord, you know what I
mean? He was even willing to help me in
a lot of ways, you know what I'm saying,
be a man. - Offender #05
Efforts by Summey, especially,
underscore the importance of offenders
to build their social capital by forming
close bonds, even developing
friendships, with community members. It
also highlights the need for respect
which offender #05 felt he did not get
from law enforcement. The "champion
effect" emphasizes the need for at least
one dedicated community member to form a
bond of trust that the offender knows
will be there for him.
I'm trying to turn
around and trying to better myself…Not
saying that I'm looking for anybody's
help but everybody needs somebody at
some point in their life. You can't do
everything by yourself that was my main
downfall. [Jim] told me, "Call if you
need somebody to talk to or you going
through something or there's a situation
you need help in. Just call." I really
wasn't used to asking for help. I'm
ready to be a man you know? But even a
man need some help in certain
situations…So I call and I tell [Jim]
every time I talk to [him] how much I
appreciate everything he done for me
cause [of]what I been through. –
Offender #05
In their examination of the success
associated with the High Point focused
deterrence model, Reuter and Pollack
(2012) suggest that "younger offenders
may be especially responsive to the
entreaties of family members, community
leaders, and social service providers
(pp. 215-216)." As it relates to the
impact of "the champion effect" as I
have presented it here, their insight
raises the question as to whether
offenders might "age-out" from its
influence. As offenders get older would
a close bond with those in the community
have less influence in keeping an
offender on the straight and narrow path
to becoming a law-abiding citizen?
Additional interviews with offenders
participating in this strategy across
the U.S. are needed to further uncover
the intricacies which make High Point's
focused deterrence model effective. Such
insight is critical to further refining
focused deterrence initiatives in an
effort to heighten their overall
efficacy.
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