Abstract
Conflict is a very important theme in an organization's activities, particularly when opposing interests and goals among individuals or groups interrupt the optimal performance of such an organization. Such situations are not alien to professional sports. The National Basketball Association lockout of 1998 is a quintessential example of opposing parties conflicting with each other in such a way as to disrupt the normal functioning of an organization. Many different approaches have been used to help explain this event. Public opinion may find it easy simply to blame the players for demanding higher salaries, or simply to blame the owners for ultimately calling the lockout. Careful analysis, though, reveals that the 1998 NBA lockout was an extremely complex event that went well beyond the financial issue. When examining this event from a variety of angles (financial, organizational, group formational, self-evaluative, racial, and structural points of view), it appears evident that a wide variety of theories is essential in order to explain the lockout in its entirety. The event can strongly be argued from a labor-relations perspective. Using the work of Karl Marx, Melvin Kohn, Melvin Seeman, Gorg Simmel, Emile Durkheim, Mayer Zald and Michael Berger, L. Richard Della Fave, and Matthew Dey, it appears evident that the 1998 NBA lockout can and should be examined from a labor-relations perspective, and this event provides a firm example for the necessity of sports to be studied within the labor relations realm. Furthermore, the problems associated with this event were not easily resolved, and the resolution itself left many questions unanswered, leading one to believe that another labor conflict will result in the NBA in the somewhat near future.
Introduction
Organizational conflict is likely to arise when an individual or group possesses a set of goals that go against another individual or group. This is especially true when social change results in alienation, greed, distrust, or hatred. Such feelings of animosity are not foreign to professional sports, particularly when millions of dollars in involved. The National Basketball Association lockout of 1998 encompassed a variety of issues, including alienation, profit-sharing, group cohesion, control over resources, class, and race. Because of the wide range of issues involved, the lockout must be studied from a variety of perspectives. Financial, organizational and structural, group formational, self-evaluative, and racial angles of analysis are all applicable, and a variety of theories come together to explain the different facets of the lockout.To begin, one can look to Karl Marx's Capital when examining the situation financially. However, the complexity associated with the underlying issues of the lockout necessitate the work of Marx (in The German Ideology) and Melvin Kohn to study the organizational structure class formation associated within the NBA. Georg Simmel and Emile Durkheim aid in explaining the issues of group solidarity and cohesion, and the works of Melvin Seeman and L. Richard Della Fave are vital when discussing the self-evaluation aspect of the lockout. Finally, the collective work of Mayer Zald and Michael Berger, as well as the NBA salary study of Matthew Dey, are relevant in explaining the racial angle inherent with the event.
Furthermore, while this conflict was resolved before an entire basketball season had to be cancelled, there is no guarantee that the NBA is immune from similar conflicts in the future. In conclusion, professional sports must be studied from this conflict and labor relations perspective, in the that the values at war during the recent string of labor disputes among various sporting organizations mark reflections in the larger society that these organizations represent.The Situation
The NBA lockout can be seen as a conflict between two opposing sides, the teams' owners versus the NBA Players' Union. On July 1, 1998, the NBA owners decided that it was necessary to "lock out" the players, thereby ceasing league operations in order to work out a new labor contract. Under the players' pact of the time, players were guaranteed at least 48% of "basketball-related income" that would arise from league activities. However, that same pact gave owners the option to re-open discussions if more than 51.7% of revenues went into paying salaries. Following the 1997-1998 season, when player salaries amounted to approximately one billion of the 1.74 billion dollars in revenues (57.2% of basketball-related income), the owners, by a 27-2 margin, decided to negotiate a new pact.
At the time, with revenues expected to reach two billion dollars and salaries expected to be approximately 61% of basketball-related income, the owners saw this change as worthy of locking out the players (Bianco, 1998, 114). This increase in league revenues was partially due to a 140% increase in television-related revenue, as shown by NBC's and Turner Sports' 4-year contracts combining for 2.65 billion dollars (Bianco, 1198, 114). Despite these increases in revenues, though, league profits were falling overall. Reaching a peak of $195 million in the 1992-1993 season, overall profits for the league fell for five consecutive years, ultimately resulting in a loss of 44 million dollars in the 1997-1998 season, upon which the lockout was called (Bianco, 1998, 114).
Upon being stopped from reporting to work, the Players' Union sought to protect various rights of its members. For example, an issue that became extremely important was the "Larry Bird exception," which allowed players to stay with their original team and not have a cap placed on their salary. This clause enabled players to remain with the same team for their entire career (if they chose to do so), and still be compensated at a rate equal to what other teams would be willing to pay them, regardless of the present team salary cap. Furthermore, the players looked to protect a fair share of all basketball-related revenues and maintain a high salary cap, so as to protect their current salaries as well. The owners, on the other hand, saw their share of the profits dwindle away into overall losses, and desired to shrink the basketball-related income share of the players by eliminating the Larry Bird exception and imposing a very rigid salary cap that could not be surpassed, regardless of previous players' salaries in preceding years.
Essentially, the lockout resembled a struggle over money, but allowed for other tensions to reach a forefront, too. For example, the issue of race was hypothesized as playing a role in the lockout. This is because of the fact that the overwhelming majority of NBA owners are white, while the vast majority of NBA players are African-American. Quotes from various NBA players and owners support this hypothesis. According to Miami Heat center Alonzo Mourning, "I think there is a perception from the owners...that we're blacks who should be happy with what we've got, fair or not" (Samuels, 1998, 55). New Jersey Nets guard Sam Cassell added, "I think the owners look at us as black, ghetto guys with tons of money that we don't deserve" (Samuels, 1998, 55). Furthermore, Chicago Bulls owner Jerry Reinsdorf and NBA legend Michael Jordan had a confrontation in 1997 that was covered with overtones. Reinsdorf offerred Jordan thirty million dollars in order to play one additional season for the Bulls, and Jordan accepted the offer. Reinsdorf then commented, "At some point in time, I know I'm going to regret what I just did" (Samuels, 1998, 56). Because Jordan is easily considered to be among the greatest basketball players of all time, Reinsdorf's comment angered many players, including Mourning, who said, "If they feel that way about [Michael Jordan], how do you think they feel about the rest of us?" (Samuels, 1998, 56). It is this type of tension, associated with what the players saw as a racially-motivated lack of respect, that exacerbated the longevity and strength of the lockout, demonstrating that more than financial issues were at work.
It is easy to think of the NBA lockout as rich players fighting with rich owners over two billion dollars in annual revenues. However, for the majority of NBA players, an annual salary of tens of millions of dollars is simply not the norm. With an average salary of $2.4 million but a minimum salary of $272,000, the NBA wage gap is rather large. This is especially evident when one considers the aforementioned $30 million paid to Michael Jordan for a single season, or with young star Kevin Garnett's 6-year contract worth $126 million. For many of these players, the lockout resulted in major financial losses that could not simply be offset by previous savings. A large amount of these players, then, were not making 7-figure salaries, and many of them will never make a million dollars over their short-lived NBA career. The issue of group solidarity comes into play in this situation as well. The players were not alike in their salaries, since it is unreasonable to compare a yearly salary of $272,000 with one of ten or thirty million dollars. When viewing the situation in this light, one can further see that money is not the sole issue at play here in creating conflict between the two groups.
Because of the sheer power of the NBA, this conflict affected groups outside of the organization in large numbers. First, basketball fans often became disheartened with the lockout and it's 191-day duration. According to one season ticket-holder of the Chicago Bulls, "If the situation next year is anything like this year, I'm out, I'm not coming back" (MacMullan, 1998, 49). A common trend was to blame the players for the lockout, according to a poll performed by the Desert News in Salt Lake City (Alessandro, 1998, 90). This alienation of fans from the game of basketball stretched to their spending habits as well. Randy Ruch, CEO of Schuylkill Valley Sports, a chain of stores in eastern Pennsylvania, claimed that the most common words from his customers when they were asked to comment on the NBA lockout were "Who needs them?"; he also added, "[My customers] want players who are playing" (Fatsis, 1998, B1). Steven Raab, marketing vice president for NBA licensee Starter Corporation, in fear that the NBA lockout would also affect other sports, warned that, during play stoppages, "consumers in general start to have a bad taste about professional sports" (Fatsis, 1998, B1).
Something that could not have helped the situation was the cancellation of the 1998 NBA All-Star game, a fan-favorite since 1951. Particularly hurt by this cancellation was the city of Philadelphia, which saw lost business of approximately $35 million (Associated Press, 1998, C2). Upon announcing the cancellation of this event that NBA fans have traditionally loved, NBA Commissioner David Stern said, "If we can't make this deal, I don't think there's hope for the sport itself," demontrating the bleak situation that the league faced, and acknowledging the hurt that fans would feel as a result (Associated Press, 1998, C2). In addition, victims of the lockout included such groups as ushers, food vendors, and other colesium workers lost large amounts of income because of event cancellations. According to one such worker at Madison Square Garden, he lost approximately one hundred dollars for each Knicks game that was cancelled, amounting to thousands of dollars that such employees rely upon every year (Smith, 1998, 173). Another worker at Madison Square Garden said, "It's the NBA [owners] that any union member should be angry with...[but the players] should keep perspective [and] think about whose lives they are affecting" (Smith, 1998, 173).
Ultimately, the 1998 NBA lockout did come to an end. After lasting for 191 days and resulting in losses amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars, both sides were able to resolve their conflict and still salvage a fifty-game schedule. On January 6, 1999, the owners and players agreed on a six-year deal, with the players approving it by a 179-5 margin, and the owners approving it by a unanimous 29-0 margin. Essentially, the contract gives 55% of basketball-related income to players' salaries, but does set a limit on the amount of money that can be paid out as salaries, which is the first such limit of its kind in major sports leagues in the United States (Fatsis, 1999, A3). In addition, limits were placed as to how much individual players could be paid, so as to avoid future one-year contracts of thirty million dollars, as was paid to Michael Jordan.
The Relevant Sociological Theory
As one can infer from the lenghty synopsis presented, the NBA lockout of 1998 was a rather complex situation that involved many issues. Profit-sharing is the obvious matter at hand, but further investigation reveals that money is not the only concern here. Such concepts as group solidarity, organizational conflict, alienation, class distinction, racial inequality, and surplus value are all very relevant to this situation. Underlying this situation is the literature regarding alienation, which is among the forefront of applicable theories in describing the NBA lockout of 1998, but many other ideas are also relevant in discussing some additional incidents associated with the lockout. This collection of theories seeks to examine the lockout from a financial, organizational, group formational, self-evaluative, racial, and structural point of view, in such a way as to gain a complete and all-encompassing perspective of this multifaceted event.
I. THE FINANCIAL ISSUE
Capital and Surplus Value
Karl Marx makes the claim that the seller [worker] is always cheated in that he can never create surplus value for himself, but only for someone else (Marx, 1867,www.markists.org). Related to class structure, surplus value essentially refers to the profit that the upper class receives as a result of the labor of the lower class. The worker is forced to sell his labor to the capitalist in order to gain property, which simply is the concrete, material representation of his labor. However, since the capitalist possesses the ability to control the ideas and processes that go into production, he or she is always at an advantage. First, labor processes only allow for the worker to receive the exchange-value of his work (Marx, 1867, www.marxists.org ). The owner of the means of production receives a profit at the worker's expense. This surplus value can be variable, but it can never be reduced to nothing, since thereby production must stop (Marx, 1867, www.marxists.org). Once surplus value diminishes, the capitalist loses all incentive to continue business interaction. For this reason, Marx draws the conclusion that capitalists are not interested in the absolute value of a given commodity, but only in the surplus value that arises (Marx, 1867, "www.marxists.org).
Application to the1998 NBA Lockout:
The general idea of surplus value is at the heart of why the lockout occurred in the first place. NBA profits reached their peak in the 1992-1993 season, when a bottom line of $145 million was generated by the league. This final profit represents the surplus value that the owners received. However, surplus value fell for the following five seasons. This demonstrates that the owners were beginning to lose incentive to continue production, i.e. continue playing games. (Falling profits can also begin to explain the previous NBA lockout of 1996, but this paper does not seek to explain that event.) Ultimately, the surplus value of the NBA became negative forty-four million dollars in the 1997-1998 season, when the owners decided to lock out the players. This, as Marx predicted, demonstrates how the capitalist will cease production when the incentive to produce disappears. The lockout, then, simply marks the owners' desire to protect their power and control over the players, as demonstrated by the surplus value that they can receive.
Also, one can see, exactly how Marx envisioned, that the absolute value of a given commodity has no worth in and of itself; the true worth of a commodity is only in the surplus value it can provide. This holds true in that the 1998-1999 season was expected to generate record revenues surpassing two billion dollars. However, even with these expectations, the owners decided to lock out the players because they knew that the overall surplus value they would receive would be very small, given that player salaries would also be at a record-high of 61% of all basketball-related income. Under the fear that surplus value would be negative once again, the lockout took place, regardless of the fact that current revenues would be at an all-time high. The owners, therefore, behaved as Marx predicted in Capital.
II. ORGANIZATIONAL, STRUCTURAL, AND CLASS FORMATION ISSUES
The German Ideology and Class Structure
The theory regarding class formation is fundamental in explaining the underlying issues behind the NBA lockout. As Karl Marx and Frederick Engels discuss in The German Ideology, society essentially divides itself into various social groups according to a person's relationship to the means of production. Related to class formation is the idea of consciousness, which, as Marx says, is "from the very beginning a social product" (Marx, 1845, www.marxists.org). As a worker sells his or her labor to a capitalist, the worker is easily vulnerable to feelings of "false conciousness" that dominates his or her ideology and outlook towards life. Marx expands upon this by saying, "Consciousness can really flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice, that it really represents something without representing something real" (Marx, 1845, www.marxists.org). Essentially, this statement indicates the power of the capitalist to make the worker feel powerless and unable to improve the situation.
In addition, Marx identifies the fact that the worker did not choose his situation, but that the logical division of society into classes arises naturally, beyond the workers control. According to Marx, as "activity is not voluntarily, but naturally, divided, man's own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him" (Marx, 1845, www.marxists.org). It does seem logical, then, that the feeling of enslavement experienced by a worker creates a level of tension between classes. This tension may be supressed for a time, but can come out at times of greater conflict. Furthermore, a worker is forced to follow the ideas of the capitalist, since "the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society is, at the same time, its ruling intellectual force" (Marx, 1845, www.marxists.org). One's power, then, is directly related to the possession of property, which is directly related to the worth of one's labor. Marx discusses this by saying, "Labor...is the chief thing, power over individuals, and as long as the latter exists, private property must exist...[,] the beginning of property having its basis only in labor and exchange" (Marx, 1845, www.marxists.org).Finally, class struggle simply encompasses the banding together of a mass of individuals who normally fight with each other over resources, since "the separate individuals form a class only insofar as they have to carry on a common battle against another class; otherwise they are on hostile terms with each other as competitors" (Marx, 1845, www.marxists.org).
Application to the 1998 NBA Lockout:
When examining the events of the lockout, one can see that the event contained all of these aforementioned elements. First, the owners of the various NBA teams, the capitalist class in this instance, control the means of production, for it is only by signing a contract with a given owner's team that a player is able to work, i.e. play in the NBA. The players then sell their labor to the owner, who possesses the power to dictate the player's destiny. The owner can choose to trade the player to another team, to make (or not make) additional contract offers to the player, and to dictate exactly how much money the player's labor is worth in terms of salary. With all of these aspects of control, it is obvious that the owner possesses a power that the players do not. In this sense, the player is powerless in that he is limited in his freedom by his contract with the team.
A player would logically expect that his performance on the basketball court would be directly related to his salary. However, this is simply not the case. A player's performance is only related to salary in its recognition by the owner. If the owner does not wish to reward the player any further, the capitalist simply is under no obligation to do so. In this regard, then, the player is forever at the mercy of the owner for recognition. Therefore, the player's labor does truly become an "alien force" as Marx says, in that the player's labor must be separated from the player himself in order to determine the player's salary. As Marx says, then, the division of labor between owner and player results in the division of property, as was the case in the lockout with regard to sharing the percentages of "basketball-related income" that the NBA received.
The tension that arose from exactly how much revenue was fair for the players to receive created escalation of the conflict, as racial issues began to come out. The aforementioned quotes by NBA players Sam Cassell and Alonzo Mourning demonstrate that the players truly perceived the situation as going beyond strict financial issues. They perceived the lockout as resulting from racial prejudice, meaning that the owners were attempting to achieve some level of white supremacy at the expense of the players, the overwhelming majority of whom are African-American. Furthermore, these racial tensions created further distance between the owners and players, i.e. capitalist and worker, thereby showing an increase in the level of alienation that developed.
Finally, as one takes Marx's idea that the workers are competing against each other normally, but band together during times of class struggle, one can easily see that this was the case in the 1998 NBA lockout. The players compete with each other constantly during games, giving their entire strength in pursuit of a championship. Oftentimes, they battle against each other rather vehemently, and sometimes engage in oral or physical confrontations. However, these "enemies" (as they were during the season) joined forces in order to unite against the owners. The working class of players recognized that they had to form a powerful, united front in order to protect their own interests, with regard to salary, but also with regard to achieving a very high level of respect that they thought that they deserved from the owners. Marx essentially predicted that this would happen when classes fought against each other. In a similar way, the owners chose to band together in order to protect their own interests against the players. Just as the players continuously battle against each other on the court, the owners are constantly battling with each other for such things as greater media coverage, a higher fan base, and getting their teams' logos on NBA products. (This is especially true in such areas as Los Angeles, where there are two franchises, the Lakers and Clippers, who compete over the same fans). Similarly, then, the owners set their competitive energy among themselves aside, in order to maximize their power against the players. In all of this, one can see that the definitive class divisions, as well as the behaviors that accompanied these class divisions, were predicted by Marx in The German Ideology.
Kohn: Alienation Results from Structure
Melvin Kohn emphasizes process as being intimately related to the power that an individual or social class can possess. Since the upper class dictates labor processes, though, the employee can easily become distanced and alienated from his job, as it becomes something that he cannot control. According to Kohn, "Control over work process has an appreciable direct effect on powerlessness, self-estrangement, and normlessness" (Kohn, 1976, 111). This statement follows the logic of Marx, since "Marx...was concerned with workers' loss of control over the means of production not only for its economic and political import, but also because it signified workers' loss of control over the essential conditions of their own occupational lives" (Kohn, 1976, 112). The worker essentially becomes an easy target for victimization, as alienation from his job makes him or her vulnerable. Upon buying into the capitalists' ideology of working harder in order to achieve more property (which brings higher status with it), work itself does not satisfy a need, but only provides a means for satisfying other needs, whereby a worker essentially belongs to another person (Kohn, 1976, 112).
Finally, the structure of the organization is related to the level of powerless and alienation that the worker will feel. As Kohn says, "Bureaucratization also is related to powerlessness...Employees of highly bureaucratized firms and organizations - where, presumably, the division of labor is generally greatest - are less likely to feel powerless than are employees of nonbureaucratic firms and organizations" (Kohn, 1976, 120).
Application to the 1998 NBA Lockout:
The players' goal of seeking more status initially involved buying into the thought that making millons of dollars in the NBA would truly make them successful. This type of thinking is characteristic of those people who own the means of production. Such thinking of the upper-class has trickled down into the lower classes, and workers begin to feel judged not by their upstanding morals or behavior, but by how many material possessions they can acquire. Playing in the NBA, then, does not necessarily satisfy any given need. Rather, as is consistent with Kohn's thinking, playing in the NBA is simply a means of achieving of other needs, such as increased respect or feelings of self-worth that accompany large material gains. It is this desire for respect that influenced the players' thoughts and anger towards the owners.
Many players (such as Alonzo Mourning and Sam Cassell) expressed a feeling of disrespect by the owners' decision to begin the lockout. Such players, therefore, were not only interested in the material gains associated with a receiving a larger percentage of basketball-related income; they were also interested in the levels of respect and admiration that society would give them as they received yearly paychecks of millions of dollars. The players' disenchantment with the owners, then, alienated the opposing parties, and the players (as employees) felt isolated from their work environment. This feeling of isolation and powerlessness is related to the vastly different bureaucratic structures in which owners and players work. For example, the owner of a basketball franchise works within a very structured environment. He or she experiences a typical workday and schedule, and is surrounded by various vice presidents, the general manager, and a staff in an office. On the other hand, though, the players' working environment is extremely different.
Players do not experience the typical workday of 9-to-5 or anything of the sort. Rather, a player's schedule involves a lot of travelling and conditioning, and is not standardized in any real way. Also, the owner's office is very bureaucratic, as is the life of any top manager. However, the player does not experience this bureaucracy. There is no set structure within a team, outside of the coach's authority over the players. Other than that, the team has a very informal structure and no set hierarchy. According to Kohn, the class of players is more likely to feel alienation, since this group has a less bureaucratic structure. This is exactly what happened during the lockout, in that the players perceived disrespect by the owners and, therefore, felt isolated from their boss and the organization. Meanwhile, the owners still worked in their offices and experienced the bureaucratic structure, thereby making them less likely to feel any level of alienation resulting from workplace. Therefore, one can see that the structure of the workplace made it difficult for the players and owners to relate to each other, thereby causing further alienation and conflict between the opposing groups.
III. GROUP COHESION AND SOLIDARITY ISSUES
Simmel's Classic Theory
Georg Simmel's classic article entitled "The Sociology if Conflict, I" remains relevant in explaining an event that happened nearly a hundred years later. Much of Simmel's discussion relates to group formation during conflict. The feelings that develop within a group can lead to cohesion within the group, as well as severe distaste for the opposition. As Simmel says, "It is useful to hate the opponent with whom one is for any reason struggling, as it is useful to love him with whom one's lot is united and with whom one must cooperate" (Simmel, 1904, 506). This statement reflects the natural human tendency to protect his or her individual self-interests, and, since the goals of a person can be reinforced when he or she bands with a group, it appears natural that human beings would seek to unite against the opposition, even if the only aspect of life providing this cohesion is the desire to overthrow the enemy group. Simmel takes this a step further in explaining that, while materialism can play a role in the detestation one group feels for another, this feeling of abhorence extends beyond materialism as the conflict continues. Simmel says, "In so far as such a danger threatens through feud within the group, the one party hates the other not alone on the material ground which instigated the quarrel, but also on the sociological ground, namely, that we hate the enemy of the group, as such; that is, the one from whom danger to its unity threatens" (Simmel, 1904, 520).
Connected to the issues related with group formation, Simmel discusses jealousy's role in initiating conflict. It becomes common for the members of the working class to envy the capitalist class, since the power inherent with being in control places the capitalist at a distinct advantage. Also, in many cases, the worker sees no real reason why the capitalist should be in control, which automatically creates jealousy, as individuals question the ruling class' legitimacy. As Simmel says, "We are jealous of another when we are of the opinion that he enjoys a fame which we deserve as much or more than he" (Simmel, 1904, 522).
Furthermore, "The feeling of jealousy interposes its quite unique, blinding, uncompromising embitterment between the persons, because the separating factor between them has taken the possession of precisely the point of their unification" (Simmel, 1904, 524). This statement reflects the power of jealousy to destroy the goals for which an organization stands. Even if a worker believes in the organization and its goals for a time, an element of jealousy can soon develop, and, when coupled with alienation and hatred, can make the worker completely at war with the capitalist who hired him or her, regardless of any past relationships that may have existed.
Application to the 1998 NBA Lockout:
One can argue that the owners and players were generally on good terms with each other while games were being played, and a team had to cooperate with its owners in order to compete for a championship. This is connected to Simmel's statement regarding how individuals will cooperate in a way that will increase their own self-interests. When a championship is concerned, the owners and players are likely to cooperate in order to achieve that goal. However, because the causes of the lockout dealt with power issues and fighting over influence in the organization, different ties were formed, and others were severed, at least temporarily. Because the players and owners could not protect their own self-interests by maintaining the relationships of the past, both sides sought to band together among themselves, player with opposing player, and owner with opposing owner.
The players' union was initially formed in order to protect the players' rights (generally in a financial sense) from oppression by the owners. During the lockout, though, the union sought to go beyond the strict financial figures, and into the "sociological ground," as Simmel says. (An example of this involves seeking to maintain the "Larry Bird exception," which would allow a player to remain with the same team for his entire career if he so chose. Because the Bird exception allows a player to remain with his loyal fan base throughout his career, it incorporates something beyond the strictly financial aspect of being a professional basketball player.) The players' union, then, acted just as Simmel predicted. Finally, Simmel's discussion regarding jealousy does come into play. Essentially, the players were jealous of the power that the owners had enjoyed for the entire NBA's history. At the same time, the owners became increasingly jealous of the large amounts of power that the players suddenly had gained. This emotion of jealousy, then, definitely played a role in how the opposing sides acted towards each other.
Durkheim and Solidarity
Emile Durkheim's work regarding group formation is key. According to Durkheim, social solidarity becomes a key factor in group formation. As the group bands together, in this case as an economic class, the formation of group norms and values creates an atmosphere where the goals of the group begin to take priority, thereby allowing for extremely strong comradery to develop. As all of the group members start to share this common ideology and put it at the forefront of their thinking, group cohesion can truly reach an apex. As Durkheim says, "Solidarity which comes from likeness is at its maximum when the collective conscience completely envelops our whole conscience and coincides in all points with it" (Durkheim, 1956, 129).
Application to the 1998 NBA Lockout:
This point of emphasis for Durkheim is of chief importance with regard to the behavior of the players. It is important to emphasize that, while some players who were not under contract in the NBA (such as free agents) did seek opportunities in international leagues, very few actually went through with playing overseas during the lockout. This is because the players were truly fighting for what they thought was right. Their entire conscience, then, believed in their cause, and persisted for more than six months until an agreement was reached. The players did not simply fold and listen to the owners' every command. Instead, the players were willing to go for six months without receiving their salaries.
Also, one must understand that the players themselves do represent a rather diverse economic group. The minimum salary of $272,000 per season is vastly different from Michael Jordan's salary of $30 million per season. So, this was simply not a situation where all of the players were the same and it was their homogeneity that caused them to unite. While this may be somewhat true in a racial context, the players were very heterogeneous economically, and yet they still truly banded together in order to gain what they felt was rightfully theirs. The decision to wait six months before reaching an agreement demonstrates the unyielding steadfastness that the players felt for their cause. Their common loyalty to the union and to their common quest of increasing their power in the NBA created a buttress that would not back down from the owners.
IV. SELF-EVALUATION ISSUE
Seeman's Theory of Self-Estrangement
In our society, it has become increasingly common for materialism to take over as the primary means for us to judge one another. Furthermore, material possessions then become a way in which we can judge ourselves. Also, since the capitalist oligopoly possesses the ability to control the dominating ideology of the time, the worker simply buys into the idea that materialism equals success because he or she knows no alternative. The worker then begins to judge his or her worth by how much property he or she can earn through the sale of his or her labor. However, when the worker realizes that he or she will never possess the ability to control his or her own work, and that he or she is simply a pawn through which the capitalist can earn a profit, the worker can quickly become alienated from his or her work.
According to Melvin Seeman, many factors can lead to alienation, but key in explaining the 1998 NBA lockout is the concept a self-estrangement, whereby an individual may experience lower self-esteem, may see himself or herself as unable to fulfill his or her potential, or may begin the comprehend the inconsistencies present in a reality that opposes the ideal. It is this self-estrangement, according to Seeman, that is extremely pivotal in feeling isolated from one's work, since "alienation taken as the failure of self-realization is almost inexhaustible" (Seeman, 1975, 104).
Application to the 1998 NBA Lockout:
When applied to the lockout, one can see that the opposing sides perceived each other as attempting to stop the other from realizing its full potential. For example, one can hypothesize that the owners felt that the NBA would never be able to maximize profits if the teams had to be distracted by the influences of the players' union and sports agents. These forces essentially demanded greater power than what the owners thought was fair. For this reason, the owners could logically anticipate that the players wanted more power over league operations, and the means for receiving more power would come from an increase in the money allocated for player salaries.
In addition, because many of the owners, as businessmen, will wish to maintain an autocratic atmosphere within which to operate, the owners will often be unlikely to encourage outside participation from individuals who will seek to decrease the owners' profits. This situation reflects self-estrangement in that the owners are under the mindset that increases in profits accompany increases in power and influence in the organization, thereby furthering the realization of one's potential. Because the players sought to take away money, and, in effect, also power, the owners felt threatened that the NBA's potential (with regard to owner interests) would never be realized. For this reason, conflict resulted, and the owners chose to lock out the players.The players' demands for greater power are also a reflection of self-estrangement. This is because many of the players (including Sam Cassell and Alonzo Mourning, as shown by their aforementioned comments) felt "held back" because of how the owners viewed the African-American race. The players perceived the situation as one in which racial lines were determining how money, and, therefore, power, were being allocated. The players' choice to unite and respond to the lockout is a reflection of their desire to fight for the ability to realize their individual potential. The self-estrangement that resulted made the players feel alienated from the owners, and, therefore, caused the lockout to become more than simply a financial issue, but one that also involved racial tension and mistrust between the opposing parties.
L. Richard Della Fave's Self-Evaluation Theory
In his article "The Meek Shall Not Inherit the Earth," Della Fave discusses such relevant concepts as self-esteem, self-evaluation, and the role of material reward. According to Della Fave, the dominating ideology in society "allocates feelings of potency, competence, and, above all, importance and self-worth in a manner congruent with that of primary resources" (Della Fave, 1980, 959). Therefore, improving one's place in society is directly related to gaining more material possessions. Furthermore, since modern society is nothing more than a group of individuals who share ideas, other people's responses to a person do play a role in how one views himself or herself. This is because, as Della Fave says, "The self is truly a creature of society as it can develop only from the reactions of others" (Della Fave, 1980, 959).
In addition, modern America's capitalist thought stresses the risk-return relationship inherent in investing. While the risk-return theory dictates that higher returns for those who accept higher risk, people do generally have an idea as to what types of returns are fair and what are not. As Della Fave says, "Human beings carry around in their heads a notion that rewards should be proportional to investments...When the principle of distributive justice is violated, people become angry" (Della Fave, 1980, 960). However, the working class is always at a disadvantage, because "those in power are assumed to be contributing more and, therefore, are seen as deserving of greater rewards" (Della Fave, 1980, 960). Also, since people tend to make various assumptions about others based upon class, those of the working classes are automatically at a disadvantage, since "normally, the individual generalizes from what is known and assumes that a person's unknown status-relevant characteristics are consistent with the known ones" (Della Fave, 1980, 960). This can damage a person's status simply by association, and, because of Della Fave's earlier statement about the reactions of others shaping one's feeling of worth, class association can place a definitive hindrance on how a person feels about himself or herself. As Della Fave says, there is a "relationship between legitimation and self-worth or...self-evaluation" (Della Fave, 1980, 961).
Furthermore, since these class differences result in the unequal allocation of property, a person of a lower class will simply expect less material goods for his labor, as "the level of primary resources that an individual sees as just for him/herself, relative to others, is directly proportional to his/her level of self-evaluation" (Della Fave, 1980, 962). However, this unequal property distribution does not go unchecked, and extremely large differentials can cause people to begin to question the legitimacy of the capitalist. This is especially true when the working class questions what the capitalist has done to deserve such amounts of property. Della Fave emphasizes this by saying, "The more incongruent the distribution of resources and self-evaluations, the more likely is the delegitimation of stratification" (Della Fave, 1980, 964).
Application to the 1998 NBA Lockout:
Della Fave's theory is all-emcompassing in that it discusses how and why individuals feel certain ways about themselves. When relating this theory to the players' behavior, one can see that the players felt as if their power in the organization, as well as their primary means of gaining respect from the owners, emanated from the salary they received. This salary also provided the sole means by which a player could judge his standing in society, meaning that his true level of self-evaluation is truly related to how much the owner is willing to pay him. The same holds true for the owners, in that their negotiating strength with the players is a means of maintaining power over the organization. The reactions of the opposing sides are the roots of where this power can originate.
Generally, though, opposing sides will prefer that "distributive justice" be maintained. It is when one side desires more than their fair share (as perceived by the opposing group) that conflict results, as was the case with the lockout. When the owners perceived that the players were getting a higher portion of basketball-related income than what was equitable, the lockout was called. As is the case with modern American society (and as Della Fave points out), people who take the greatest risks, and those who are at the top of the organization, are expecting the highest rewards. Here, then, the owners believed in this mentality and expected to receive greater rewards than the players.
Furthermore, as Della Fave also predicted, the owners took what was known about various aspects of the players, and applied it to the players themselves. For example, one can argue that the owners took what they thought they knew about the African-American race and applied it to the players in a stereotypical fashion, meaning that they used stereotypes regarding African-Americans and automatically assumed that the players fit this given set of stereotypes. Given that, generally, the owners and players come from very diverse backgrounds, they are very prone to having issues relating to each other, meaning that the owners were unlikely to judge the players correctly.
Finally, as one's level of self-evaluation increases, it becomes increasingly likely that such a person will feel that he or she deserves a higher place on the hierarchy, which is exactly what happened in this instance. The players began to lose faith in the stratification process, given the fact that they truly felt that they were the ones most deservant of revenues. The owners' perception that the players were attempting to destratify the current situation, meaning that they players were almost trying to be equal to the owners with regard to power in the organization, influenced their decision to cease operations, and to put the players back in their "rightful place," according to what the owners thought that should be.
V. THE ISSUE OF RACE
Zald and Berger: Societal Reflections
Mayer Zald and Michael Berger emphasize that conflict often results within an organization with the goal of change at the forefront. However, they point out that change within the organization may not necessarily be the only goal that the group desires to achieve. Rather, the source of the conflict may be that the members of a certain group or class may wish to change a pivotal aspect of society, but are simply using this one organization as an example of their overall frustration. As Zald and Berger suggest, "It is important to note that, while the proximal goal of the movement is to change the behavior and goals of organizational authorities and the structure of organizations, the real goal may be changes in the larger society" (Zald, 1978, 842).
Application to the 1998 NBA Lockout:
The view of Zald and Berger holds true with regard to both sides of the lockout. First, one can definitely argue that the players were fighting for racial equality in all of society. Under the impression that the owners were acting abusively for racial reasons, the players sought to show the owners that the union would not back down. Furthermore, the players, by their actions, essentially helped to fight for labor rights for workers in all aspects of business. In their very strong response to being locked out, the players demonstrated to workers everywhere that they should fight for power in their respective organizations. The players, then, in effect, fought for the rights of all workers, particularly professional athletes. Their actions reflect the idea that professional athletes deserve large sums of money and power, and have shown owners in other sports that professional athletes are simply not going to back down from what they consider to be unfair treatment.
The theory also applies to the owners' behavior. The owners sought to show society that workers cannot expect to gain large amounts of money and power without a response. In this case, the lockout was the owners' means of showing the players who was in charge. Similarly, then, the owners wished to show other sports that the players were becoming too powerful, and that it is necessary for owners of the franchises to avoid such a scenario. This situation can be applied to other organizations outside of professional sports, meaning that the owners have shown all capitalists that they must protect their own business interests and powers from being diminished by unions or outside agents.
Matthew Dey's Findings on Race and NBA Salaries
Matthew Dey's 1997 study regarding the effects of race on NBA salaries is extremely relevant in explaining the 1998 NBA lockout. Previous studies had found that white basketball players were paid significantly more than black players of similar experience. For example, the Kahn and Sherer study (1988) found that blacks earn 21-25% less than whites. Next, the Koch and VanderHill study (1988) concluded that white players had a salary advantage of 12%, and the Brown, Spiro, and Keenan study (1988) found that blacks were paid approximately 14% less than whites. However, Dey's study in 1997 discovered that this "white player premium" in salaries was no longer existent (Dey, 1997, 87). As Dey says, "The racial wage differential that existed in the NBA during the mid-1980's vanished over the past decade" (Dey, 1997, 87). 1.
This is a significant change that the league experienced, and there are various factors that may have influenced this change. First, between 1988 and 1997, the NBA saw an increase in the level of free agency and also added four new franchises. Both of these changes demonstrate the increase in demand for NBA players that occurred during this time. Also, the institution of the salary cap occurred during this period. Such changes in the salary structure increased the need for sports agents to fight for more money for the players. Dey's findings can be interpreted in various ways, and his explanation of his findings is very strong. As he says, "Three possible interpretations are an exogenous increase in the demand for that NBA and its players, the new-found strength of the NBA Players' Union, and the elevated use of agents" (Dey, 1997, 90).
Application to the 1998 NBA Lockout:
As Dey points out, studies performed in 1988 demonstrated that white players were paid between twelve and twenty-five percent higher than their minority counterpart of similar experience. This, therefore, reflects a norm within the NBA at the time. Also, in the years leading up to the early-1990s, the NBA was reaching a peak, with its ultimate profits being $145 million in the 1992-1993 season. Therefore, the owners saw the league as very stable and on the rise during this time, and respected the norms that made the NBA increase in popularity, even if such aspects as paying white players a given premium were involved in the NBA's increasing success. However, as Dey's study suggests, the NBA's salary structure changed between 1988 and 1997, as shown by the lack of a salary premium paid to white players in 1997.
This change reflects a changing of the norms that brought the NBA to its height. One can logically assume that the owners saw this change, and also noticed that their profits had declined every year between 1992-1993 and 1997-1998. (Noticing this change over time may have played a role in the 1996 NBA lockout, as well. However, the overall profits of the NBA in 1996 were still positive, and the 1997-1998 season saw an overall loss for the league.) Because any change that decreases the overall profitability of the league is not likely to be favored by the owners, it appears obvious that the owners were not in accord with this change in salary structure.
Also, the owners may not have favored the fact that white and black individuals were being paid almost equally. As previously mentioned, the players perceived the lockout to be racial in nature, and such a thought is supported by two lockouts (1996 and 1998) immediately coinciding with overall equality with regard to player salaries. Finally, the increasing power of sports agents and the players' union, as well as the higher demand for NBA players resulting from the addition of four expansion teams, virtually required the owners to pay players more than they had paid in earlier years. The lockout, then, reflects the desire on the part of the owners to restore the norms of the past, where the NBA was at its peak in terms of profits, and, since increasing profits are a reflection of overall power in modern society, the changing norms of the league were viewed by the owners as detrimental to the power of the NBA as a whole.
EVALUATING THE THEORIES
Upon examining the NBA Lockout of 1998, one can see various categories into which the theory falls. Because of the complexity of the situation, no previously mentioned theory is all-emcompassing in explaining the event. Rather, this situation calls for different theories in helping to explain each of the different aspects of the lockout. The lockout essentially contains five distinct aspects: 1) the financial aspect; 2) the class-related, structural aspect; 3) the group formation and solidarity aspect; 4) the self-evaluation aspect; and 5) the racial issue and its relation the NBA salary structure, as well as its association to the increased power of the players' union.
The first topic of consideration is the financial aspect. One must remember that, in addition to being a means of entertainment, a professional sports team is a very powerful business. Most relevant in explaining this issue is Karl Marx's work expressed in Capital. The concepts of surplus value and one's relationship to the means of production provides the economic framework within which the lockout took place. However, because Marx only treats the economic and financial situation in Capital, one cannot explain the lockout with these concepts alone. It is the complexity associated with the organizational, structure, and alienation-related issues that force one to move beyond Capital alone in helping to explain the entire event.
Moving beyond the financial issue, the structure of the NBA leads one to study the class-related issues associated with the entire organization. Relevant in explaining this is Marx's theory contained in the German Ideology, as well as Kohn's work. As previously mentioned, Marx used the concepts of class, false consciousness, and alienation with regard to a worker's relationship with his job.It does appear, though, that this theory does possess a weakness, in that Marx did not discuss the role of a strong labor union in being able to influence labor rights in the workplace. One can easily get the impression that Marx treats the capitalist as virtually all-powerful. However, in this case, the role of the players' union was pivotal in the owners' decision to begin the lockout. Therefore, the German Ideology does apply, but cannot be used alone in explaining the entire event.
Next, Kohn's theory regarding structure is applicable to this aspect of the lockout. His work is very strong is explaining the role of organizational processes and bureaucracy in contributing to alienation. Perhaps this theory's main weak point is that it discusses how a worker can become distanced from his work and from the owner, but it fails to address how an owner can feel alienated from his work and his employees. However, because Kohn does remind the reader that the capitalist is able to control the processes associated with the organization, the owner does have a very strong presence in Kohn's theory.
Related to this class structure, the issue of group cohesion and solidarity is relevant. The works of Simmel and Durkheim aid in explaining this aspect of the event. Simmel's discussion of the furtherance of self-interest through group cohesion is pivotal in explaining why players' on competing teams, as well as competing owners of the various franchises, many of whom took part in long-lasting bitter rivalies, chose to band together. Also, the furtherance and protection of the players' self-interests explains why they formed a union in the first place; the right to lock out the players represents the owners' protecting their interests. Furthermore, Simmel's discussion of jealousy is relevant in describing the materialism and power struggles that were at the forefront of the lockout.
Durkheim's theories regarding social solidarity also help in explaining this aspect of the event. The players on opposing teams, who battle against each other during the season, banded together against the front offices of their own respective teams. The same holds true for the owners. The replacement of the team versus team (franchise versus franchise) scenario by the owners versus players (and players versus owners) scenario is worthy of study, and Durkheim's theory is helpful in explaining this fact.
With regard to the self-evaluation aspect of the lockout, the works of Seeman and Della Fave are relevant. Seeman's thoughts regarding self-estrangement are extremely beneficial in explaining how each side felt, with regard to realizing their own potential through material gain. Also, this situation gained complexity in that a concession by one side automatically gave more power to the other, since the percentage of basketball-related income is a zero-sum game in this case. However, Seeman examines this concept of self-estrangement from an individual perspective, rather than applying it to group formation.
The NBA lockout, then, makes one ask: Does forming groups affect the level of self-estrangement that a person feels and, if so, could this be part of the reason why the players chose to band together, in that their common feeling of self-estrangement, combined with alienation from their work and loyalty to the union, gave them more in common with each other than with their bosses in the front office? The complexity of this question can yield the hypothesis that the players did experience self-estrangement (among many other feelings), but a single theory is unable to explain the entire picture. Along the same lines as Seeman, Della Fave's discussion on self-evaluation ties in with this aspect of the situation. The obvious correlation of money as being equal to power in the NBA emphasizes the reluctance of each side to concede to the other, which is related to why the lockout lasted as long as it did (over six months). Also, his thoughts on distributive justice and the delegitimation of stratification support the hypothesis that the players began to feel just as important as the owners, if not more important. The limitation to Della Fave's theory is that he applied these concepts primarily to individual workers, and this application to the lockout calls for applying the theory to groups. One can easily hypothesize, though, that group formation will arise as people feel that distributive justice has been violated, which will create exacerbating feelings that the current level of stratification is either delegitimized (which is the players' perspective), or that it must be restored (which is the owners' perspective).
The collective work of Zald and Berger, as well as Dey's study of the salary structure of the NBA, aid in explaining the final aspect of the lockout, that of individual and situational differences in creating tension. Zald and Berger stress the importance of applying individual goals to the greater society. This is important in explaining the racial tensions that arose between the owners and players, in that the players sought for racial equality through their pursuit for more money and greater power. Also, though, this theory is helpful in explaining the owners' reaction to the increasing power of the NBA players' union. From the owners' perspective, then, one can see that the owners, by their actions, wanted to show society that capitalists need to protect their own interests, rather than allow for the unionization of laborers to dictate the direction that an organization will take. Dey's study is extremely effective is demonstrating the salary changes that occurred in the NBA between 1988 and 1997. These changes in salary structure, in the owners' view, ultimately created five consecutive years of declining profits, culminating in the loss of forty-four million dollars that the league experienced in the 1997-1998 season. The drawback to this study, though, is that these findings only reflect a single study, which may possess the risk of bias and some element of unreliability. However, if one takes Dey's study as accurate (and there is no real reason not to trust his results), one will see that the increasing power of the players' union and virtual racial equality of players' salaries were significant changes that the league experienced. While one could argue that these changes were necessary in order to establish greater fairness in the league, one can also see that these changes made the league much less profitable, which goes back to the initial financial issue of the lockout.
These aforementioned theories work together in explaining the overall complexity of the 1998 NBA lockout in a diverse and all-encompassing fashion. While each of these theories cannot simply act alone in describing every facet of the event, this combination of authors and their writings is very effective in discussing all of the financial, structural, group-related, self-evaluation, racial, and salary-related aspects of the 1998 NBA lockout.
CONCLUSION
The outcome of the NBA lockout of 1998 was successful in that it did create a "quick fix" for the overall financial issues of the time. The players and owners agreed on an initial figure of 55% of all basketball-related income to set aside for player salaries. One can argue that, since a financial agreement was made, a "power-level" agreement was made, as well. Because both sides agreed on this figure, it was perceived as being equitable at the time. However, the NBA lockout of 1998 came to a conclusion without addressing the issues of race, class, or alienation. Racial tensions cannot simply subside because a new figure for player salaries is agreed upon. Because these racial tensions were never directly confronted in agreeing to a new pact, one must be skeptical as to how effective the new agreement really is. Next, the issue of class was never resolved. It appears obvious that the owners and players had a rather adversial relationship during the lockout, partially because of the class structure of the organization.
Because no real effort was made to address the class differences and different mindsets of the opposing parties, it appears unlikely that the owners and players really feel any differently about each other than how they felt during the lockout. Finally, the issue of alienation cannot simply be solved by agreeing upon how to share basketball-related income. The players and owners were distrustful of each other during the lockout, and a working relationship as complex as this will not be solved with simple means when large amounts of money and power are at stake. In addition, the bureaucratic differences that made the owners and players unable to relate to each other's workplace were never addressed. Also, a time of healing is necessary for the fans to regain previous levels of interest and excitement. In this case, without the fans, there really is no organization. Therefore, the players and owners need to realize that fans' preferences will dictate the future of the league, and future battles perceived by the fans as being rooted in greed may be extremely detrimental to both sides. Because of all of these factors, it appears that the NBA is simply gearing itself up for another lockout and/or strike in the not-so-distant future. One can say this with confidence because of the failure of the previous negotiations to address the issues of race, class, and alienation. Once another power struggle between both sides begins, one can expect an event similar to the NBA lockout of 1998, and, once again, racial issues, class issues, and alienation issues will be the underlying factors creating the dispute, meaning that one must look beyond the strictly financial figures in solving the NBA's labor problems.
RELEVANCE TO THE DISCIPLINE
Much of the behavior within organizations is a reflection of the values, beliefs, and norms of a given society. Given that premise, one can study organizations and get a taste of that which a society values. While it has become commonplace to study the structure and behavior of business and government organizations, the contemporary professional sports franchise has evaded in-depth analysis by a large number of sociologists. Also, while various practitioners of the sociology of sport have thoroughly studied such topics as racial stacking, power within teams, and a league's salary structure, the discipline needs to move forward and investigate conflict within professional sports from a labor and managerial perspective. The late twentieth century was marked by a string of labor conflicts in professional sports, including the Major League Baseball players' strike of 1994, the National Hockey League lockout of 1994-1995, and the National Basketball Association lockouts of 1996 and 1998.
The discipline needs to examine, study, and analyze these events, and look for any possible relationships among them. For example, one can ask why labor conflicts arose across three professional sports leagues over a very short time, meaning that this was not an isolated phenomenon.
Conversely, the discipline should examine why the fourth of the "major sports," the National Football League, which did undergo a labor conflict in the 1970s, was immune from such conflict in the 1990s. In addition, the further investigation of younger sporting organizations that have not yet been victim to labor conflict, such as Major League Soccer or the Women's National Basketball Association, may allow sociologists to see whether or not such organizations are likely to experience similar problems. Also, there remains another issue worthy of study. All of these aforementioned disputes occurred at the professional level.
Possibly, the discipline needs to extend its conflict theories not just to the highest levels of sports, but also to the lower levels, and examine if and how American culture trains future generations of athletes. For example, why have collegiate basketball players not gone on strike? Has society trained its athletes in such a way that it is simply unacceptable or deviant to strike until he or she reaches the professional ranks? Is it possible, though, that college athletes will simply copy the behavior of their professional counterparts and go on strike? Will such college athletes demand more than just a scholarship in exchange for their services? The answers to such questions may allow for a reduction in the overall conflict levels in sports, or will, at the very least, provide hypotheses regarding what causes labor conflicts in sports, as well as potentially create a model for an organization that can be more immune from such problems.
Finally, sports reflect the human desire to compete, to demonstrate one's power, and to be victorious. At the same time, though, modern professional sport is riddled with racial tension, self-evaluation through material judgment, and financial issues. Modern American society values sports, as shown by the yearly revenues of billions of dollars that sporting events yield. With these problems, why do Americans tend to value sports? Is it that sports gain increased entertainment value from the labor conflicts that result, or is it that the average American is simply ignorant to the existence of such hypothesized realities as racial stacking and position profiling? Furthermore, the discipline should investigate the actual effects of these conflicts over time. In the short-run, one can see the overall alienation that fans feel during and immediately after the lockout or strike, as shown by revenue losses and overall disinterest during these times. However, the long-range consequences should also be studied. While it may be too soon to investigate the recent series of labor conflicts from a long-range perspective, future analysis is required.
Connected to this, is it possible that Americans continue to patronize professional sporting events simply because they are unaware of the underlying factors of the organizations that promote conflict? In other words, is Americans' view of sports so idealized that they simply block out and are unable to recognize such issues as sport's hypothesized racist structure or an athlete's quest for material power as being more important than the simple goal of winning a championship? If all fans became aware of such realities, what would be the effects on sporting institutions? Would fans "go on strike" if they became aware of these realities, or would such a recognition have the opposite effect? The functionalist approach to sociology would argue that sport serves a function in society, or its existence would not be justified. Well, if fans eventually feel alienated from sport because of these labor conflicts and work stoppages, would professional sport cease to exist as we know it currently? Is there a point where fans will simply stop spending money on sports as entertainment, upon recognizing the negative realities of sport's structure that cause labor conflict to arise? These complex questions illustrate the extent to which sport must be analyzed, recognized, and examined in a complete and thorough manner.
The study of organizations and labor-related conflict can be substantially furthered by and in-depth analysis of professional sports leagues and franchises, in terms of what causes the conflict and what can potentially prevent such conflict from occurring. Hypotheses related to the formation of an organization immune from such negative conflict may be formed through the in-depth study of professional sports, and such hypotheses regarding human behavior may prove to be invaluable in the furtherence of the sociology of sport, the sociology of conflict, management and organizations, the study of labor relations, and the entire discipline as a whole.
1 This finding by Dey goes against the previously mentioned studies performed by Kahn and Sherer (1988), Koch and VanderHill (1988), and Brown, Spiro, and Keenan (1988), all of which concluded that a racial premium was integrated into the NBA's salary structure.
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